Difference between revisions of "Fulton Judiciary Weaponizes Project ORCA"
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Fulton Judiciary Weaponizes Project ORCA (view source)
Revision as of 19:17, 6 November 2023
, 19:17, 6 November 2023→Follow the Money
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[[File:Elected Judge numbered.png|center|550px|elected judge]] | [[File:Elected Judge numbered.png|center|550px|elected judge]] | ||
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As shown above, [1] campaign donors contribute money to an elected judge's campaign, [2] campaign donors then gain influence over the elected judge's decisions and, in turn, the judge caters to the desires of his or her donors. [3] | As shown above, [1] campaign donors contribute money to an elected judge's campaign, [2] campaign donors then gain influence over the elected judge's decisions and, in turn, the judge caters to the desires of his or her donors. [3] The elected judge then uses his or her campaign funds to influence the voters and the judge is therefore able to increase the likelihood of keeping his or her job in an election. [4] Taxpayer money funds the salary of the elected judge, though the taxpayers do not have influence over a judge's decisions because taxes are mandated by the government and not the result of a judge's performance on the bench. | ||
====Part-Time (Hourly) Senior Judges==== | ====Part-Time (Hourly) Senior Judges==== | ||
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[1] Campaign donors contribute money to an elected judge's campaign. | [1] Campaign donors contribute money to an elected judge's campaign. | ||
[2] Campaign donors | [2] Campaign donors, by virtue of their donations, gain influence over the elected judge's decisions and, in turn, the judge caters to the desires of his or her donors. | ||
[3] | [3] The elected judge then uses his or her campaign funds to influence the voters and the judge is therefore able to increase the likelihood of keeping his or her job in an election. | ||
[4] Taxpayer money funds the salary of the elected judge, though the taxpayers do not have influence over a judge's decisions because taxes are mandated by the government. | [4] Taxpayer money funds the salary of the elected judge, though the taxpayers do not have influence over a judge's decisions because taxes are mandated by the government and not the result of a judge's performance on the bench. | ||
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'''Senior Judge'''<br> | '''Senior Judge'''<br> | ||
5 | [5] The elected judge assigns a case to a senior judge. | ||
6 | [6] The senior judge is compensated with tax dollars at the hourly rate equal to that of a full-time judge in the same county in which they are presiding; though the taxpayers do not have influence over a judge's decisions because taxes are mandated by the government and not the result of a judge's performance on the bench. | ||
7 | [7] The elected judge uses this case assignment power to influence the senior judge and the senior judge, in turn, caters to the desires of the elected judge in order to increase the likelihood of being assigned to cases in the future. | ||
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<br> | <br> | ||
'''Mediator'''<br> | '''Mediator'''<br> | ||
8 | [8] The elected judge assigns a case to a mediator (who is often times also a campaign donor and/or a senior judge). | ||
9 | [9] The parties in the case are ordered to mediation for the purpose of trying to settle the case. | ||
10 | [10] The parties are ordered to pay the mediator at an hourly rate usually between $150 and $350 per hour. | ||
11 | [11] The elected judge uses this mediator assignment power to influence the senior judge and the senior judge, in turn, caters to the desires of the elected judge in order to increase the likelihood of being assigned as a mediator in the future. | ||
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