Difference between revisions of "Faux Process And Rubber-Stamped Orders"
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In | In 2019, I represented a mother in Muskogee County fighting for custody of her 5-year-old son. The mother had primary custody at the time and an intermittent hearing was held to potentially appoint a Guardian Ad Litem to the case. That hearing was not regarding the change of custody and the Muskogee County Superior Court did not change custody that day. the judge asked the father’s attorney to draft an order appointing the Guardian Ad Litem to the case. The opposing counsel drafted the “proposed” order for the judge to review. In the proposed order, however, the opposing attorney inserted a clause that changed full custody from the mother to the father. The judge signed the order without scrutiny and, without notice or a hearing on the matter, the mother lost full custody of her son. It took over a year and a judge's recusal for the mother to regain primary custody of her son. | ||
So what happened here? How could a judge simply sign parental rights away at the drop of a hat, without notice or a hearing? This is what I call “faux process” (contra to “due process”) and what many attorneys refer to as a “rubber-stamped” order. The formula for this injustice is as follows:<br> | So what happened here? How could a judge simply sign parental rights away at the drop of a hat, without notice or a hearing? This is what I call “faux process” (contra to “due process”) and what many attorneys refer to as a “rubber-stamped” order. The formula for this injustice is as follows:<br> | ||
(1) First, a judge holds a hearing.<br> | (1) First, a judge holds a hearing on a specific matter.<br> | ||
(2) Then at the hearing, the judge makes | (2) Then at the hearing, the judge makes a verbal unwritten ruling and tells the attorney for the "winning party" to draft a proposed order for the judge to sign.<br> | ||
(3) The drafting attorney then inserts wording awarding additional remedies that were not part of the judge's | (3) The drafting attorney then inserts wording awarding additional remedies that were not part of the judge's verbal unwritten ruling nor within the scope of the hearing.<br> | ||
(4) Lastly, the judge signs the order without scrutiny, thus awarding the drafting party | (4) Lastly, the judge signs the order without scrutiny, thus awarding the drafting party the remedies improperly inserted into the proposed order by the drafting attorney.<br> | ||
That was not the first time I | Now, obviously the judge erred by signing an order that the judge did not draft nor review. But why? That was not the first time I witnessed the entering of a rubber-stamped order, nor was it the last. In fact, my first recollection of such injustice occurred at the hands of Judge Carl W. Bowers, and my most recent experience was at the hands of Judge G. Grant Brantley. While I sincerely want to believe that these were honest mistakes, rare flukes caused by the coincidental alignment of the planets, mere cursory research into the personal backgrounds and experience of these two judges shows otherwise. | ||
Early in Judge Bowers' career, he served as Judge Brantley's staff attorney--a job likely handed to Bowers in light of his family's longtime relationship with Judge Brantley. Specifically, former Georgia Attorney General Mike Bowers was Judge Brantley's supervising officer in the military. | Early in Judge Bowers' career, he served as Judge Brantley's staff attorney--a job likely handed to Bowers in light of his family's longtime relationship with Judge Brantley. Specifically, former Georgia Attorney General Mike Bowers was Judge Brantley's supervising officer in the military. |
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